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Abstract—The use of RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) 
technology can be employed for automating and 
streamlining safe and accurate brand identification (ID) 
uniquely in real-time to protect consumers from 
counterfeited products. We outline a Web-based Anti-
counterfeit RFID System (WARS) to combat counterfeit 
branding. By placing brand tags (RFID tags) on brands at 
the point of manufacture, vendors and retailers can trace 
products throughout the supply chain. Despite these 
potential benefits, security, and privacy issues are the key 
factors in the deployment of a web-based RFID-enabled 
system in anti-counterfeiting schemes. This paper proposes 
an asymmetric cryptosystem to secure RFID transmission in 
the retail supply chain using Elliptic Curve Cryptographic 
(ECC) techniques. ECC is one of the most powerful, and 
widely use public-key cryptography techniques today, which 
provide greater strength than other current cryptosystems 
(such as RSA, and DSA/DH) for any given key length. In 
addition it enables the use of smaller keys to get the same 
levels of security as RSA, resulting in significant means for 
wireless and mobile applications, including handheld 
devices. 
 
Index Terms—Asymmetric or Public-Key Cryptography; 
ECC; RFID; WARS; Counterfeit Branding  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Counterfeiting is a significant and growing problem 
worldwide, occurring both in  less and well developed 
countries. Considering the countries worldwide, almost 
five percent of all products are counterfeited [1], [2]. 
Counterfeiting continues to increase globally because of 
the high marg ins achieved through counterfeiting by 
manufacturers and the demand for trade name goods at 
value prices by consumers [3]. The problem of 
counterfeiting is further magnified because of emerg ing 
new economies in Eastern Europe and Asia [4]. In  the 
past, counterfeit goods were easy to identify because 
these products typically  represented luxury goods made 
with shoddy materials and sold in limited venues such as 
open-air markets, cosmopolitan in cities such as New 
York and Los Angeles. Today, however, counterfeit ing 
impacts virtually every product category: from fake foods, 
beverages and everyday household products to 
pharmaceuticals, auto parts and consumer electronics [5]. 
Counterfeiting refers to the unauthorized production of 
goods protected by trademarks, copyrights, or patents. 
Due to the technological advancements in materials and 
processing techniques, many counterfeit goods have 
found their way to legit imate bricks-and-mortar retail 
stores, such as Walmart, and Target, in developed and 
developing countries. Many successful brands also 
become vict ims of the worldwide trend towards 
counterfeiting, where cheap imitations of the brands are 
distributed by the counterfeiters. Nowadays, the brand 
counterfeiting context is increasingly dominated by the 
unconstrained presence of fake brands [6]. Therefore, this 
topic has generated a substantial body of scholarly 
discussion, research and thought [7]. 
The majority of the research on counterfeiting has 
focused attention on the demand side of counterfeiting [8],  
[9], [10] that is consumer accomplices who engage in 
aberrant consumer behaviour [11], [12] and deliberately  
purchase counterfeit goods with limited research 
addressing the supply side [13]. It can be argued that 
counterfeiters are good marketers because they have 
found a need and are finding a way  to fu lfill it [14]. To  
develop techniques that effectively combat the problem 
of counterfeiting, it is necessary to determine and identify  
the existence of the segment(s) of consumer accomplices 
who purchase counterfeited goods.  
The economic  and social consequences of 
counterfeiting are enormous. It is estimated that brand 
holders lose approximately  $600 billion of revenue 
annually due to counterfeiting and make up 
approximately seven percent of world trade [15].In the 
USA economy, the cost of counterfeiting is estimated to 
be up to $200 billion per year [16]. A large majority of 
these products include clothing, luxury goods, 
entertainment equipment, medicines and pharmaceutical 
products, handbags, automotive parts and high tech 
products etc. Manufacturers of affected products have a 
direct loss in sale revenues; this is often directly related to 
losses in tax revenues, and may also result in job losses. 
Furthermore, counterfeit goods are everywhere on the 
Internet and if a  brand has revenue generating capability 
or brand credibility, it will surely be counterfeited and 
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sold online. Online  auction sites and business-to-business 
websites also provide the ideal online medium for 
counterfeit sales that worth billions. Michael Danel, the 
secretary general of the World Customs Organizat ion 
identified that if terrorism did not exist, counterfeiting 
would be the most important criminal act of the early 21st 
century [15]. 
The effect of counterfeit ing is always greater than the 
value of the counterfeit product itself. By damaging 
consumers’ perception o f the performance, reliability, 
and safety of branded devices, counterfeiting tarnishes 
brand image, customer loyalty, and satisfaction. Actions 
to limit counterfeits can arise from both supply and 
demand side, considering the tactics companies employ 
to deter counterfeits [16] and the motivations that make a 
counterfeit an interesting option for some customers [17], 
[18]. Also, there is no single solution to this problem;  
anti-counterfeiting strategies should be multifaceted. 
However, the anti-counterfeiting strategies are possible 
by the use of mobile/wireless technology to combat 
counterfeiting. The application of these principles can be 
facilitated by the use of the wireless technology such as 
Radio  Frequency Identification (RFID) [19]. Today's 
advanced technology is capable of uniting brand tags 
(RFID) and data processing into a single integrated 
system.  
A Web-based Anti-counterfeit RFID System (WARS) 
can be used to automate and streamline safe and accurate 
brand identification (ID) uniquely in real-time by product 
market ing managers and to protect consumers from 
counterfeited products [20]. By  placing brand tags (RFID 
tags) on brand items at the point o f manufacture, 
manufacturers can trace products throughout the supply 
chain. The retail industry can use an online application, 
such as WARS at  the point of sale to  document 
authenticity of their brand products at retail in  real-t ime. 
The brand tags can store the unique product Ids, the 
product information and these data ultimately can also be 
stored in an associated (i.e., manufacturers) database. If 
the brand is not properly tagged or the brand tag is not 
associated (i.e., the product information is missing) with 
the database, then the retailers know the product is 
counterfeited. Additionally, by placing brand tags at the 
point of manufacture, not only can brands be traced 
throughout the supply chain, but it can also prevent 
counterfeit brands from entering into the supply chain. 
These RFID-based systems can collect and organize  
data exponentially faster and more accurately. The unique 
ID number on  standard RFID tags (e.g., passive) can be 
used to verify the authenticity of the products to which 
they are attached. As in the distribution chain, RFID-
based systems in retail can greatly aid in reducing the 
cost of keeping accurate inventory data. With min imum 
staff and less time, retailers can keep  accurate inventories. 
They can spend more t ime providing service to customers 
rather than counting product. In addition, the accuracy of 
the real time inventory data enables product market ing 
managers to ensure that hot selling items are properly  
stocked and to ensure replenishment order for these items 
are placed as quickly as possible. The RFID-based 
systems enable the product marketing managers to 
identify slow moving items quickly and to take correct ive 
action to goose demand through promotional or 
advertising activity before a ‘fire  sale’ is needed. Thus 
RFID systems help managers to maintain their margins. 
These systems are, also, a significant aid in deterring theft 
in retail environments. RFID enable brand tags to trigger 
alarms when they are removed from the store without a 
due process. In the past several decades, RFID-based 
systems have been successfully deployed for anti-theft 
purposes. 
Despite these potential benefits, security, privacy and 
system deployment issues are the key factors in the 
deployment of a  RFID-enabled system in  anti-
counterfeiting schemes and imposes significant threat on 
overall profitability [21]. Since a RFID-enabled web-
based anti-counterfeiting systems use a wireless 
communicat ion system, retailers or vendors and network 
servers require a strong security system (such as public-
key cryptography) and mutual authentication protocol in  
their conversation [22]. Over the past three decades, 
public key cryptography such as RSA (Rivest, Shamir 
and Adelman) and DSA  (Dig ital Signature Algorithm) 
has become a mainstay for secure communications. It  
provides the foundation for both key management and 
digital signatures. Public key cryptography is used to 
distribute the secret keys in key management and to 
authenticate the origin of data and protect the integrity of 
that data in digital signatures. However, over the past two 
decades, new techniques such as Elliptical Curve 
Cryptography (ECC) have been developed for better 
performance and higher security than these public key 
techniques [23].  
One of the protocol proposed by Beller, Chang, and 
Yacobi [24], which provides mutual authentication and 
key agreement between users and servers with lower 
computational burden on the user side. This is important 
since the retailers usually communicate using a small, 
portable handset (e.g., smart phone) with limited power 
and processing capability. In  this paper we will examine 
and propose a solution using ECC to address the security 
issues relating to RFID-enabled anti-counterfeit ing 
systems. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section II illustrates 
the application of a real-time Web-based Anti-counterfeit 
RFID System (WARS) to curb counterfeit b randing. 
Section III d iscusses the Security issues relating to 
WARS. Section IV illustrates the security measure and 
outlines the proposed solution of WARS. Section V 
discusses the implementations of ECC on WARS. 
Section VI illustrates the practical implication of WARS 
and ECC. Section VII concludes the paper. 
II. WEB-BASED ANTI-COUNTERFEIT RFID SYSTEM 
RFID is an advanced emerging technology that 
elegantly provides a solution to leading g lobal brands in 
multip le industries including retail, pharmaceuticals, 
electronics, entertainment, aviat ion, IT and many more. 
WARS represent one of the most promising approaches 
to curb counterfeit branding. WARS main ly consist of 
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smart brand tags, a RFID Reader and retailer’s  IT system. 
It can be embedded into the retailer’s  web portal (i.e., 
dashboard) to identify the authenticity of the brand tags. 
Each unique brand tag can be passive, semi-passive or 
active [25]. Passive tags can be used for both 
reading/writ ing capabilit ies by the RFID reader and do 
not need an internal power (i.e ., battery). They get 
energized by the reader device  and have a read range 
from 10 mm to almost 10 meters [26]. Passive tags are 
cheap, ranging from $0.25c to $0.40c each and life  
expectancy is unlimited. Thereby, we recommend the use 
of passive brand tags (13.56 MHz International Standards 
Organization, ISO 15693 tag) with the read range of one 
meter attached to each brand at the point of manufacture 
[19]. The main components of the WARS are shown in 
Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1.  Main components of WARS 
The passive brand tag antenna picks up radio-waves or 
electromagnetic energy beamed at  it from an RFID reader 
device attached to mobile devices (e.g., iPad, iPhone or 
smartphone) and enables the chip to transmit the brand’s 
unique ID and other informat ion to the reader device, 
allowing the product to be remotely identified [20]. A 
mobile device-based RFID reader will ensure that the 
identity of the brand product is passed to the device (e.g., 
iPhone) and automatically logged into an integrated 
database server (e.g., SQL server) using a wireless 
network. The RFID reader can also request any additional 
informat ion from the brand tag that is encoded on it [26]. 
The reader converts the radio waves reflected back from 
the brand tag into digital informat ion [27] then passed 
onto WARS (embedded in a smartphone/iPhone) for 
processing. The brand database can also link with other 
databases through Internet for retriev ing specific brand 
informat ion. 
A. Multi-layer WARS Architecture 
The retail industry currently faces counterfeit branding 
issues, mult i-layer RFID arch itecture can establish an 
infrastructure to address such a challenge, to automate 
and simplify the functionality for tracking and detecting 
brands wirelessly. Figure 2 shows the multi-layers (i.e., 
six layers) of RFID-based WARS architecture, namely, 
physical layer, middleware layer, IT infrastructure 
management layer, b rand data layer, application security 
layer and graphical user interface layer.  
The physical device layer consists of the actual RFID 
hardware components (such as brand tag, and mobile  
device-based RFID reader) that integrate with WARS for 
capturing brand data automatically.  
 
 
Figure 2.  Multi-layer architecture for anti-counterfeit  RFID systems 
The middleware  layer acts as the standard mechanism 
for getting rapid connectivity between brand tags and 
mobile device-based WARS. The IT infrastructure 
management layer is responsible for managing and 
controlling the local retailer’s  IT components, for 
example computers, back-end servers, networks, and 
printers. The brand data layer interacts with a back-end 
database (e.g., SQL server) and includes a data 
query/loading approach using SQL (structured query 
Language). The application security layer ensures a 
reliable proper security measures such as Cryptosystems. 
Finally, the GUI layer is responsible for coordinating and 
displaying the brand data.  
B. Web-based WARS Application 
Figure 3 shows a retailer’s  mobile-based web portal 
(i.e ., dashboard) integrated with WARS. By clicking 
‘Brand Authenticity’ tab on the dashboard will enable  
WARS. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Retailer’s web portal (dashboard) 
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Figure 4 shows the windows based WARS application, 
which can be embedded with a mobile device  for 
capturing brand informat ion (e.g., product ID, p roduct 
name, or brand name) automat ically and wirelessly. The 
WARS application identifies every product uniquely with 
a brand ID embedded in b rand items through RFID-
enabled mobile devices. A brand tag only contains a 
unique ID and perhaps other informat ion (e.g. p roduct 
and brand name), which a  WARS application uses to 
retrieve a product record  stored in the retail branding 
database (e.g., SQL server). A WARS can also be linked 
to other (e.g., brand manufacturer) databases.  
 
 
Figure 4.  WARS application for automatic brand detection 
In case of counterfeit branding issues, a retailer or 
vendor can use WARS for detecting and determining the 
right brands. After running the WARS application, the 
retail staff needs to connect RFID reader first by clicking 
“Connect RFID Reader”  button. Then detect brand 
product(s) by clicking “Search Tagged Product” button.  
When the required brand items are in the mobile  
device-based RFID readers energizing field, the WARS 
application beeps, indicating that the identified brand is 
not counterfeited and displays the brand in formation (e.g.,  
tag ID, product name, and brand name) in real-time in the 
list box as shown in Figure 3. 
In case of counterfeit  brand items, the WARS pop-up 
an error message, “Brand informat ion is not found”. 
III. SECURITY THREATS TO WARS 
Counterfeit branding has been an issue in many 
industries that affect only the bottom line and a 
company’s  reputation. High value luxury goods, such as 
handbags, wristwatches, and other products, are among 
the most susceptible to counterfeiting. The brand holders 
spend large amounts of money to trace and eliminate the 
counterfeit products and the people responsible to ensure 
that counterfeit products do not sully their brands.  
Most of the security threats in retail supply chain are 
attributed to the security of the communication channel 
between authentic RFID-enable reader devices (e.g., 
smart phone) and the brand (RFID) tags through the air 
interface (i.e ., wireless communication). A brand tag 
reading occurs when a reader device generates a radio 
frequency “interrogation” signal that communicates with 
the brand tag (e.g., a tagged camera), t riggering a 
response from the brand tag [28]. Since RFID-enabled 
anti-counterfeit systems uses open air space as a 
communicat ion channel (wireless), the content (such as 
brand name) of the communication may be exposed to 
 
 confidentiality - eavesdropping, unauthorised 
brand tag reading, privacy threats, and crypto 
attacks, 
 integrity - replay attacks, and message 
reconstructions, and  
 availability - active interference, and Denial of 
Service (DOS) attacks, or system services can be 
used fraudulently.  
 
Further with respect to Read/Write (reprogrammable) 
tags, unauthorized alteration of brand data can be the 
possibility in the supply chain. As a result, security is the 
key issue which presents a host of challenges for the 
successful implementation of RFID-enabled anti-
counterfeit branding systems. To address RFID security 
issues, we propose a separate security layer (i.e., 
application security layer), which ensures a reliable  
proper security measures such as authenticity, 
confidentiality and intractability over the wireless 
communicat ion channel [9] in the RFID-enable anti-
counterfeiting architecture. The security layer implements 
a strong cryptographic algorithm such as ECC in itially  
proposed by other researches [29].  
IV. SECURITY MEASURES FOR WARS 
To address these security threats, we outline the 
following security measures: 
 Attaching a brand tag (RFID) to the high value 
product – Brand tags can be attached to or is 
permanently embedded in each high value 
products (such as a wristwatch) at the point of 
manufacture to prevent counterfeit products from 
entering the supply chain. Including a digital 
signature in these brand tags can create 
authentication schemes that are ext remely  
difficult  for counterfeiters to circumvent. This 
will add an extra layer of security, which ensures 
that the counterfeiters cannot duplicate the 
signature as it is an effect ive measure to prevent a 
repudiation of service. 
 Strong cryptographic techniques and mutual 
authentication to protect high-value products - 
Cryptography is the science of keeping 
informat ion secure. It provides confidentiality, 
authentication, integrity and non-repudiation. 
Cryptography can be classified into two 
categories: symmetric and asymmetric. In  
symmetric key cryptography, both parties share 
the same key for encryption as well as the 
corresponding decryption. Assymetric or public  
key cryptography uses a combined public and 
private key. A public key is used for encryption 
and its corresponding, intrinsically linked 
private/secret key is used for decryption. Both 
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public and private keys can be used 
interchangeably.  
In this paper, we suggest Asymmetric or public-key 
cryptography - the core technology behind digital 
signatures and authentication, offers the robust protection 
that can combat counterfeit branding. 
A. Asymmetric or Public-key Cryptography 
Over the past 30 years, public  key  cryptography has 
proved to be so useful that it has become a common part 
of everyday life  for secure communications over the 
Internet. Emerg ing technologies such as e-commerce web 
site uses a secure server employs public-key 
cryptography to secure online transactions. Figure 5 
shows an asymmetric cryptography for secure 
communicat ion, which has two keys - a public key and a 
private key. The sender encrypts the message using the 
receiver’s  public key and sends it to the receiv ing end. 
The receiver then uses his/her private key to decrypt the 
message. That is, encryption with the public key can only  
be undone by decrypting with the private key. 
 
 
Figure 5.  Key based asymmetric algorithm for secure communication 
Public-key cryptography gives the base for both digital 
signatures and key management. For dig ital signatures, it 
is used to authenticate the orig in of data and protect the 
integrity of that data. For the key management, public key 
cryptography is used to distribute the secret keys such as 
RSA and Dig ital Signature Algorithm (DSA) or Diffie-
Hellman  (DH). RSA has revolutionized the asymmetric  
authentication and provided the foundation for Web site 
encryption via Secure  Socket  Layer (SSL), Transport 
Layer Security (TLS), server administration via Secure  
Shell (SSH), secure e-mail and IP security (IPsec) [34].  
 
B. The Case for ECC 
RSA and DH are two widely used algorithms today to 
secure the Internet. The problem with RSA is based on 
factoring the product of two large primes and DH related 
to the discrete logarithm problem for finite  groups. These 
factoring algorithms get more efficient as the size of the 
numbers being factored gets larger. When the prime 
numbers start to get very long, even only multip lication 
part can take some time on a low powered device such as 
mobile phone. The gap between factoring and 
multip lying is not sustainable in the long term for mobile  
and low-powered devices that have limited computational 
power. While to keep continue with RSA by increasing 
the key size, that comes with a cost of slower 
cryptographic performance and complexity on the client 
[36]. That is, the strength of technology provided by 
asymmetric  cryptography is direct ly proportional to the 
key size used. As the key gets longer, the computational 
and software complexity also get longer. All these 
demonstrate that RSA is not the ideal choice for the 
future cryptography. 
In this situation, ECC appears to offer a better tradeoff: 
high security with s maller and faster keys. It is also to 
have small keys especially in a world, where more and 
more cryptography is done on less powerful mobile  
devices such as mobile phones, iPhones and iPads. 
Additionally, the US National Institute for Standards and 
Technology (NIST) has recommended that the 1024-bit  
key sizes for RSA are sufficient for use until 2010. After 
that, NIST recommends that key sizes for RSA can  be 
increased to an acceptable level for the next decade, or 
ECC over public key algorithms to take advantage of its 
key strengths (i.e., small key). So, ECC can be an 
emerging alternative to public-key cryptography, and can 
be used to create faster, smaller, and more efficient 
cryptographic keys [30]. In this paper, we suggest ECC to 
combat counterfeit branding. 
C. Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)  
ECC is a public key encryption technique based on 
elliptic curve theory in cryptography was first proposed 
by Victor Miller and Neal Koblitz in 1985. ECC provides 
higher strength per bit than any other current 
cryptosystem (such as RSA, DSA, etc.), thus, making it  
suitable for wireless and mobile  applications, including 
smartcards and handheld devices. ECC provides an 
excellent solution not only for the data encryption but 
also for the secure key transport between two 
communicat ing parties [35].  
The main uses of ECC are - key  exchange, dig ital 
signature, authentication, and message transmission. The 
countries like United States, United Kingdom, Canada 
and some NATO member countries have adopted some 
form of ECC for future systems to protect classified 
informat ion between their governments. The United 
States Department o f Defense aims  at replacing  almost 
1.3 million existing equipment over the next  10 years that 
uses ECC for key management and digital signatures [23].  
The main advantage of elliptic  curve over the other 
public key systems such as RSA, DSA etc. is the key 
strength. The following Table  1 summarizes the 
comparison of the key strengths ECC and other public 
key schemes [23]. 
TABLE I.  COMPARISON OF THE KEY STRENGTHS BETWEEN 
RSA/DSA AND ECC. 
RSA/DSA Key Size (bits) ECC Key Size (bits) 
1024 160 
2048 224 
3072 256 
7680 384 
15360 512 
 
The above table shows that a 256-b it ECC key requires 
the equivalent strength of a 3072-bit RSA key fo r security; 
a 512-b it ECC key requires a 15360-b it RSA key. So, 
ECC algorithm takes smaller key size for encryption and 
decryption. It helps to secure the data at transmission 
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channel. Moreover, it is clear that greater strength for any 
given key length enables bandwidth savings, lower 
computational loads and memory requirements [23][30].  
D. Advantages of ECC 
The advantages of using ECC are as fo llows [36]: 
 ECC has a s mall key size, which provides greater 
speed, less storage and better performance.  
 ECC enables a faster execution, where computers 
which operate on bitwise operations with binary 
numbers can perform moduli of numbers near 
powers of two much faster than other numbers. 
 ECC has a greater flexibility in choosing 
cryptographic system. 
 ECC can revolutionise faster and smaller chips in 
smart cards, cell phones, pagers and other 
electronic devices. These smaller chips have less 
heat generation and less power consumption. 
 For the same key sizes, ECC is significantly 
harder to break than RSA and DH. 
 ECC is quickly becoming the go-to solution for 
privacy and security online. 
 ECC is particularly beneficial for application 
where, high speed is required; computational 
power is limited (e.g., wireless devices, PC cards); 
integrated circuit  space is limited (e.g., wireless 
devices, PC cards); and bandwidth is limited (e.g.,  
wireless communications and some computer 
networks). 
Despite these potential benefits, ECC also has 
drawbacks that involve complex mathemat ics and 
applications can be difficult  to explain or justify to clients. 
Additionally, elliptic curve arithmet ic is slightly more 
complex per bit than both RSA or DH arithmet ic and the 
added strength per bit is more than makes up for any 
extra compute time [35]. 
E. ECC Public-key Cryptosystem 
An elliptic  curve is a  plane smooth continuous curve, 
which can  be represented by an equation y
2
 = x
3
 + ax + b  
is shown in  Figure 6, where x and y  take on values in  the 
real numbers. ECC generates keys through the properties 
of the elliptic curve equation instead of the traditional 
method of generation as the product of very  large prime 
numbers.  
 
 
Figure 6.  Graph of the elliptic curve function 
An elliptic curve represents a looping line intersecting 
two axes as shown in the above figure. ECC is based on 
properties of a mathemat ical equation derived from points 
where the line intersects the axes. Multiply ing a point on 
the curve by a number will produce another point on the 
curve, but it is quite d ifficu lt to identify the number, even 
the original po int and the result are known.  
The following Figure 7 p lots the above curve with the 
whole number points that represent as messages. You 
could imag ine taking a message and setting it as the x 
coordinate and solving for y to get a point on the curve. 
The equation for a line on the curve still has the same 
properties. Moreover, the dot operation can be efficiently  
computed. 
 
 
Figure 7.  Plotting an elliptic curve 
We propose an ECC public key [16] cryptosystem to 
communicate between two parties – sender and receiver. 
Both sender and receiver must agree to use an elliptic  
curve Ep (s,r) to communicate the messages, where p  is a  
prime number. The sender (S) selects a large random 
number α, which is less than the order of Ep (s, r) and a 
random point A and C on the elliptic curve. The sender 
computes S1 = α(C + A) and S2 = αA. S keeps the random 
number α, and the point A  as his/her private keys and 
publishes S1 and S2 as a general public keys. 
Similarly, the receiver (R) selects a large random 
number β and a po int B on the elliptic  curve. He/she 
computes R1 = β(C+B) and R2 = βB. R keeps the random 
number β and the point B as his/her private keys and 
publishes R1 and R2 as general public keys. After 
publishing the public keys, the communicating parties 
again calculate the following quantities and publish them 
as their specific public  keys of each other. 
 The sender calculates SR = αR2 and publishes it 
as his/her specific public  key for receiver. 
 The receiver calculates RS = βS2 and publishes it 
as his/her specific public  key for sender. 
The encryption and decryption algorithms or processes 
are as follow: 
 Encryption: If R wants to communicate the 
message M then all the characters of the message 
are coded to the points on the elliptic curve using 
the code table, which is agreed upon by the both 
S and R. Then each message point is encrypted to 
a pair of cipher points E1,E2 . R uses a random 
number γ, which is different for the encryption of 
different message points. 
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E1 = γC 
E2 = M + (β + γ) S1 – γ S2 + SR 
 
After encrypting all the message character, the receiver 
converts the pair of points of each message point into the 
text  characters using the code table. Then he/she sends 
the cipher text to S in the public channel (i.e ., air). 
 
 Decryption: After receiv ing the cipher text, S 
converts the cipher text  into the points on the 
elliptic curve and recognizes the points E1 and E2 
of each character. Then he/she decrypts the 
message as follows. 
 
M = E2 – (αE1 + αR1 + RS) 
 
V. IMPLEMENTATION OF ECC ON WARS  
The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm 
(ECDSA) is the elliptic  curve analogue of the DSA. 
ECDSA was first proposed in 1992 by Scott Vanstone 
and was accepted in 1998 as an ISO standard (ISO 
14888-3), accepted in 1999 as an ANSI (American 
National Standards Institute) standard (ANSI X9.62), and 
accepted in 2000 as an IEEE (Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers) standard (IEEE 1363-2000) and a 
Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 
standard (FIPS 186-2). ECDSA is implemented over 
elliptic curve as mandated by ANSI X9.62.  
The ECDSA have a smaller key size, which provides 
greater speed, faster execution, less storage and better 
performance. Th is makes the ECDSA ideal for s mall 
devices such as smart phones and smart cards. It  includes 
three phases - key generation, signature generation, and 
signature verification [37]. 
A. Verification Process of Counterfeit Branding on WARS  
The manufacturer embeds a brand tag (i.e., smart RFID 
tag) in each of its brand at the point of manufacture. Each 
brand tag contains a private key and a digital cert ificate 
that has the approval of luxury  products (such as 
handbags, wristwatches, and other products) 
manufacturers, as well as identify ing information  about 
the brand, such as the name, description, etc. A dig ital 
certificate is an electronic  document which uses a digital 
signature to bind together a public key with a  brand tag. 
This certificate  is used to verify that a  public  key  belongs 
to a brand tag. The digital signature schemes can be used 
to provide the basic cryptographic services, such as data 
integrity, data orig in authentication and non-repudiation. 
In this research, an elliptic curve digital signature is 
created by the ECDSA to ensure that the brand identity 
has not been tampered with, i.e ., the legitimate brand. 
Retailers or vendors can use WARS at the point of 
purchase to verify the authenticity of high value products 
(or brand tags). The following steps are needed to verify 
counterfeit bands with retailers IT system using ECC: 
 A RFID-based smart phone (i.e., WARS) enables 
the brand tag to transmit brand’s  unique ID and 
pass it to the retailer’s  web-based IT (i.e ., host) 
system. 
 The retailer’s  host system first requests a 
certificate (a random number along with a public  
key). The host then combines that number with 
the public key to create a challenge message, 
which the host sends back to the brand tag. 
 The brand tag uses its securely stored private key 
to compute the elliptic curve digital signature of 
the challenge message and sends this digital 
signature back to the host. 
 Using the corresponding public key, the host 
verifies the signature by decrypting random 
number. The verificat ion processes are shown in 
the following Figure 8. 
 
 
Figure 8.  Verification processes of counterfeit branding 
Only an authentic brand with knowledge of the private 
key can produce a correct d igital signature. Using the 
verification result, the host decides whether to 
authenticate the brand to respond to RFID-enabled reader 
device. The host can also determine whether brand ID 
and other informat ion are correct  for use with the host 
and could also use the brand to track. 
VI. PRACTICAL IMPLICATION OF WARS AND ECC 
A drawback of existing anti-counterfeit ing measures 
(such as barcodes) is the low achievable  degree of 
automation when authenticate the originality of a product. 
With existing schemes, large-scale authentication, for 
example required in  retail warehouses, are not feasible. 
RFID helps to address this problem, and provides the 
possibility to implement extensible, secure protection 
mechanis ms in  the retail supply chain. A RFID-based 
real-t ime automatic  Anti-counterfeit RFID System 
(WARS) can be implemented in retail supply chain for 
combating counterfeit branding. Retailers or vendors 
would use WARS at the point  of purchase to authenticate 
the brands [32].  
As ECC employs both public and private key, a  
counterfeiter cannot derive one key  based on knowledge 
of the other key. Thus, only brand tags that know the 
private key  can respond correctly to a retailer’s  IT 
systems (i.e ., host) challenge and the host system can 
determine this knowledge using only the corresponding 
public key. If a counterfeiter cannot obtain the private 
key, then the host can assume that any brand responding 
correctly is authentic. 
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In case of corrupt retailers or vendors, customer can 
verify the brand authenticity via SMS (Short Message 
Service), which is getting popular now-a-days and almost 
been used everywhere. Using SMS, consumers can send 
messages; make purchases and receive notificat ion, all on 
a mobile device. For example, financial services 
institutions, such as banks, and credit card companies, are  
experiencing high rates of customer adoption and usage 
of SMS-based mobile  banking services as the services 
become available on all mobile  telephone technologies 
[33].  
Upon purchasing a brand, customers can find an item 
specific code, such as brand serial number. Then, they 
text  the code to manufacturer using their mobile  phone 
and receive a  reply  confirming that the brand is genuine 
or warn ing that it may be counterfeited. 
In addition, ECC is now used in a wide variety of 
applications [36]:  
 the US government uses ECC to protect internal 
communicat ions,  
 the Tor project  uses it to facilitate assurance of 
anonymity, it is  
 the mechanism used to prove ownership of 
bitcoins,  
 provides signatures in Apple's iMessage 
service,  
 used to encrypt DNS informat ion with 
DNSCurve, and  
 preferred method for authentication for 
secure Web browsing over SSL/TLS. 
 Latest version of Internet browsers (e.g., 
Chrome or Firefox) are using ECC 
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper we have outlined, and designed a Web-
based Anti-counterfeit RFID System (WARS) to curb 
counterfeit branding. The authors have shown the 
application and practical implicat ion of the above system. 
Efforts are being made to develop the complete system 
(i.e ., WARS) for use in  retail sectors to prevent 
counterfeiting. We also propose a separate security layer 
in WARS architecture to address RFID security issues 
and propose a reliable proper security measures such as 
authenticity, confidentiality and intractability using 
public-key  cryptosystems (ECC) over the wireless 
communicat ion. The advantage of ECC over the other 
public key systems such as RSA, DSA etc, is the key 
strength, which provides greater security and more 
efficient performance.  
The security and implementation properties of the ECC 
seem to be over the highest cryptographic strength per bit 
among all existing public-key  systems. The RSA-based 
protocols have significant problems in terms of the 
bandwidth and storage requirements. Security is not the 
only attractive feature of ECC. The ECC is also more 
computationally efficient than the public key system. So, 
it is clear that ECC is an emerg ing alternative to public-
key cryptosystems, and has the smaller key  sizes result in  
smaller system parameters, smaller public-key certificates, 
bandwidth savings, faster implementations, and lower 
power requirements. After a  slow start, ECC is now 
gaining popularity, and the pace of adoption is 
accelerating. Thus, the use of the ECC in wireless 
communicat ion system is highly  recommended to combat 
counterfeit branding.  
Nevertheless, implementation of such a security 
system requires specialized knowledge and a significant 
investment in hardware and software development, has 
prevented most manufacturers from employing it. 
However, as the microprocessors available to 
counterfeiters wanting to hack these systems continue to 
become faster and cheaper, a key length that seemed 
adequate a few years ago may no longer offer adequate 
security. For this reason, effective asymmetric  
implementations have been too costly for all but the most 
high-end applications. 
Finally the implementation of the proposed system 
could be an interesting area of future research. 
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